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ABSTRACT 
 
This study inspects the relative first-day returns of tech/internet IPOs before, during, and after the 
1999-2000 dotcom “bubble” to investigate whether market inefficiency and agency conflicts were 
resolved.  Using IPOs during the 1990 to 2004 period, we discover significant reversals in 
underpricing of internet IPOs following the large-scale investigation of IPO valuation practices 
led by New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ur investigation of the relative pricing of internet and non-internet IPOs begins with a general look at the 
underpricing phenomenon.  "Underpricing" occurs when issuing firms receive less than a market-based 
“fair” price, and early, often handpicked, buyers receive more as they later sell the initially underpriced 
shares.  At issue is whether such mispricing represents a wealth transfer that provides evidence of principal-agent 
conflicts.  Also at issue is whether markets are inefficient, as the last to buy experience lower than expected risk-
adjusted returns on their investment.  The current study reviews literature related to IPO pricing and compares returns 
in the periods surrounding the dotcom bubble.  The following section introduces the underpricing phenomenon along 
with general descriptive statistics and is followed by a more complete review of the literature and a short section on 
one of the premier players in the IPO scandal, Frank Quattrone.  This is followed by data, results, and conclusions. 
 
THE UNDERPRICING PHENOMENON 
 
 Initial public offerings attracted empirical investigation long before the dotcom bubble of the late 1990s, 
primarily because they represent a true test of valuation.  Underwriters are charged with researching the industry and 
macroeconomic conditions faced by the launching firm and must offer guidance on the appropriate per share price.  
Confronted with the possibility of overpricing the security and having a failed offering, the temptation is to err in the 
other direction.  Similarly, managers, who normally will hold shares for a certain lockup period, also stand to benefit 
from a stock price that will soar rather than settle.  Studies prior to the dotcom period indicated that first-day returns 
had not risen above 21.1% (figure for 1995) [Reilly and Norton, 2003, p. 318] and averaged 16.4% [Ritter, 1991, p. 
3]. 
 
 In 1999 and 2000, however, average first-day returns swelled to 69% and 55.5%, respectively [Reilly and 
Norton, 2003, p. 318], and this apparent market imbalance did not go unnoticed.  An investigation into IPO allocation, 
pricing, and favoritism commenced, and regulatory actions ensued.
1
  This paper looks at post-dotcom returns for 
evidence that these reforms improved market efficiency.  The following section offers a more detailed review of the 
pertinent literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 For a good picture of this period, including Frank Quattrone‟s apparent role, see the following:  Smith [2003]; Elkind et al [2001]; Gasparino and 
Schroeder [2002]; Gasparino [2002]; Opdyke and Simon [2003]; Smith et al [2003]. 
O 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 Several studies address the issue of IPO underpricing and the resultant transfer of wealth, most notably Ritter 
[1991], Aggarwal et al [2002], Loughran and Ritter [1995 and 2004], and Hansen [2001].  Ritter [1991] sets the tone 
for expected returns, providing average IPO first-day returns from 1975 to 1984.  Estimated returns were found to be 
16.4% on average at the end of the first trading day [Ritter, 1991, 3].  Loughran and Ritter [2004] examine the effects 
of underpricing from the 1980s until after the dotcom bubble.  According to the sample population used, during the 
1980s first-day returns were a meager 7%; from 1990 to 1998, returns more than doubled (to 15%), and during the 
dotcom bubble, returns averaged 65%.  Following the dotcom bubble (2001 to 2003), average first-day returns 
reverted to 12% [Loughran and Ritter, 2004, 5-12].  Aggarwal et al [2002] contrasts internet and non-internet IPOs.  
Their findings support two notions: 1) that underpricing and manipulative research coverage represented methods 
deliberately used in pricing IPOs during the 1990s and the dotcom bubble, and 2) that internet IPOs had greater 
underpricing.  Specifically, "…the internet subsample… [171 firms with underpricing in excess of 50%, two-thirds of 
which were internet-related] has significantly greater underpricing (mean of 66.2% and median of 33.3%) than the 
non-internet subsample (mean of 35.2% and median of 17.6%)" [Aggarwal et al, 2002, 119].  Some studies address 
the dotcom industry specifically, including Ljungqvist and Wilhelm [2003], Johnston and Madura [2002], and Bartov, 
Mohanran, and Seethamraju [2002].  None, however, offers a look at all three periods to contrast internet and non-
internet IPOs.  Before reviewing our data and results, the following section offers a brief description of one of the 
major players in the IPO scandal, Frank Quattrone, and the results of the Spitzer investigation. 
 
FRANK QUATTRONE AND FALLOUT OF THE IPO INVESTIGATION  
 
 More than any other single contributor, Frank Quattrone, an employee with Credit Suisse First Boston, is 
accredited with manufacturing the dotcom bubble.  "Quattrone came to Silicon Valley in the early 1980s, a time when 
the big Wall Street firms regarded tech banking as just an interesting niche business.  But Quattrone believed that the 
tiny, struggling companies that then made up the tech galaxy were destined to become fast-growing giants…" [Elkind 
et al, 2001, 38].  From 1998 to 2000, Quattrone and his team underwrote 138 tech firms, more than the combined total 
of his competitors.  Although the potential of the companies he underwrote was not always as favorable as the 
research that promoted the stock, Quattrone continuously made sure that optimistic coverage of the company was 
given to investors and that IPO shares were allocated to "friends of Frank."  Regardless of his practices, Quattrone was 
able to hype up issuances of companies he planned to underwrite to reap high first-day returns [Elkind et al, 2001, 34-
43].  VA Software Corp. (previously known as VA Linux Systems) represents one example of this pricing 
exuberance.  On December 9, 1999, Linux offered its IPO shares at $30; suspicion of faulty pricing practices and 
favorable share allocation arose when first-day prices reached as high as $299 [premium.hoovers.com, 10008].  With 
Quattrone dominating the tech industry, competing banks were forced to follow suit in the way they issued IPOs.  
Quattrone's dirty practices were becoming the industry standard [Gasparino and Schroeder, 2002, A1]. 
 
 When many of the internet stocks crumbled following the first few weeks of issuance, an investigation into 
IPO allocation, pricing, and favoritism spearheaded by New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer commenced, 
and regulatory actions resulted.  According to Smith et al, Spitzer's findings included IPO allocation favoritism, 
fraudulent research reports, unfair research or research not given in good faith, illegal acceptance of tainted research, 
and "IPO 'spinning'" [2003, C1].  Changes were mandated in the investment banking industry, and reparations 
(including a $1.4 billion settlement) from the investment banks were required [Smith et al, 2003, C1, C3].  In addition, 
legislation included "a clear separation of stock research from investment banking, 'independent' research for investors 
at no cost, better disclosure of stock ratings, and the ban of IPO 'spinning'" [Zuckerman and Craig, 2003, C1, C9].  
The current paper looks at post-dotcom returns for evidence that these reforms had a positive impact on market 
efficiency.  If investment banks are conforming, agency relationships should improve, with issuing firms receiving a 
fairer price and markets more efficiently equating risk and return. 
 
DATA AND RESULTS 
 
 In defining internet stock classifications (listed on the following page), we relied on a system of classification 
November 2004, we turned to Hoovers.com‟s IPO Central Website for IPO offer dates, offer prices, and first-day 
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used. in Marshall et al [2004, p. 107] and SIC codes that define internet related companies.  By using these two 
sources as sample standards, our population is synchronized with previous studies.  For internet IPOs from January 
1998 to closing prices.  SIC code verification was found at www.osha.gov.  Results from Loughran and Ritter [2004] 
 and Johnston and Madura [2002] were also used 
 
 
SOURCE:  Beverly B. Marshall, Clarie E. Crutchley, and Diane Lending, "Early Internet IPOs Versus 
Subsequent Entrants," Journal of Economics and Finance 28, No. 1 (Spring 2004): 107 
 
 
 Table 1 on the following page shows the number of firms issuing IPOs for the three periods—pre-dotcom 
(1990 to 1998), dotcom (1999 to 2000), and post dotcom (2001 to 2004).  These are categorized as internet related or 
non-internet related.  By comparing both types of IPOs, first-day returns can be better understood.  The numbers 
indicate that the pre-dotcom period was characterized by fewer dotcom IPOs (1081) than non-internet IPOs (2315), 
while the dotcom bubble showed a significantly different picture, with 585 internet-related IPOs in a two-year period 
versus 218 non-internet IPOs.  The period following the bubble evidenced a significant reversal (86 dotcoms, 276 
non-internet IPOs).  Even more striking, however, are the relative yields during the three periods.  For internet related 
IPOs, the average initial return experienced before the dotcom bubble was 22.2%, while non-internet IPOs averaged a 
yield of 11.3%.  During the bubble, however, internet IPOs averaged a whopping 80.6%, with non-internets averaging 
a relatively meager 23.1%.  Following the dotcom bubble, internets averaged yields of 11.4%, while non-internets 
averaged 9.12%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internet Classification Description of the Classification Example 
Advertising Providing advertisement services on the Web or do 
direct marketing 
Doubleclick, Inc. 
Consulting and Designers Develop and install web technologies and offer Web 
design services 
MarchFIRST, Inc. 
Content and Communities Online communities that are formed to support 
groups within common interests 
Go2net, Inc. 
E-Commerce Enablers Provide software for e-commerce Ariba, Inc. 
E-Tailors Sell to consumers online Amazon.com, Inc. 
Financial Services Provide online financial services such as banking 
and stockbrokerages 
NetBank, Inc. 
ISP/Access Provide Internet services or access EarthLink, Inc. 
Internet Services Provide services such as website hosting or e-mail 
management 
Versign, Inc. 
Performance Software Provide software such as operating systems or 
software for working with multimedia content on the 
Web 
Tibco Software, Inc. 
Search and Portal Internet Search Engines provide help to users in 
finding information on the web.  Portals provide an 
entry to the web, often including a search engine and 
navigation aid. 
Yahoo, Inc. 
Security Create and sell software for Internet-oriented 
software such as firewalls and encryption 
Check Pt Software Technology 
LTD 
Speed and Bandwidth Provide services that improve the performance of 
using the Internet 
Cisco Systems, Inc. 
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Table 1: Number of IPOs and Average Returns: Before, During, and After the Dotcom Bubble 
 
 Internet Non-Internet 
   
1990-1998 period N = 1081 N = 2315 
 Return = 22.2% Return = 11.3% 
   
1999-2000 period N = 585 N = 218 
 Return = 80.6% Return = 23.1% 
   
2001-2004 period N = 86 N = 276 
 Return = 11.4% Return = 9.12% 
SOURCES: 1990-1998 and 1999-2003 data from Jarrod Johnston and Jeff Madura, “The Performance of Internet 
Firms Following Their Initial Public Offering,” The Financial Review 37 [2002], 529, 534.  2004 data from 
http://premium.hoovers.com/global/ipoc/ index.xhtml?page id=10008. 
 
 
 In short, prior to the dotcom bubble, the number of tech and internet related firms that issued IPOs 
constituted approximately one-third of all IPOs.  During this time period, average initial returns for internet related 
IPOs almost doubled the average initial returns on non-internet IPOs, perhaps a reflection of the additional risk of 
these relatively hard-to-value stocks.  During the dotcom bubble, the number of internet IPOs increased dramatically, 
to more than twice the number of non-internet IPOs.  The average returns of internet related IPOs almost quadrupled 
the average returns experienced for non-internet IPOs.  Following the dotcom bubble, internet IPOs dwindled in 
comparison to the number issued during the bubble, while the number of non-internet IPOs increased.  Internet IPO 
yields settled at roughly half their pre-bubble level. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Prior to and following the dotcom bubble, internet and non-internet IPOs can be viewed as having normal 
levels of returns; as defined by Ritter [1991], Reilly and Norton [2003], and Elkind et al [2001], normal returns are 
between 10% and 20%.  The initial day returns experienced during the dotcom bubble were far from normal.  Can we 
ascribe the return to normalcy to the actions of Elliot Spitzer?  Probably not, since the sanctions were not enacted until 
early 2003.  Even by the end of 2000, however, the investigations into investment banks issuing high-yielding internet 
IPOs had begun, perhaps spurring other I-banks to price the securities more appropriately.  Certainly, information was 
being revealed to market participants surrounding the misdeeds of the investment bankers, and perhaps it is a 
testament to the resiliency of the markets to react to this information, or as Robert Shiller states it:  “Indeed it is thanks 
to a market‟s ability to respond appropriately to such factors, for a variety of investments, that well-functioning 
financial markets generally promote, rather than hinder, economic efficiency” [Shiller, 2000, 18]. 
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